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1 Introduction
This paper examines the eﬃciency of workers’ decision to search. Searching for a job
involves deciding how much to search. This gives rise to important externalities, since
it modifies the matching opportunities of other agents: when one individual engages in
search, she raises the probability that firms fill their vacancies, but creates congestion
which reduces the rate at which other job seekers find a job. It has been shown that
those two externalities can oﬀset each other in particular cases (see Mortensen, 1982,
and Hosios, 1990). In this paper, I complement this analysis by considering a matching
model where workers have multi-dimensional skills. In this framework, searching for a
job involves deciding how far to search. Hence, the focus is on the trade-oﬀ made by
the unemployed between complete specialization and the odds of employment. Matching
externalities then result in an ineﬃcient allocation of workers to jobs. I show that the
unemployed are insuﬃciently selective, i.e. they prospect too many jobs.
The main motivation of our work relates to the impact of heterogeneity on eﬃciency
in frictional models of the labour market. Two main papers have addressed this question,
and they obtained very diﬀerent results. On the one hand, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) —
hereafter MZ — oﬀer the ‘mismatch of talents’ framework. This is a multi-sector matching
model with ex-post Nash bargaining over the match surplus where workers have (sym-
metric) sector-specific skills à la Salop (1979). Firms and workers are distributed along
the perimeter of a technological circle. The productivity of a pair is strictly decreasing in
the distance between firm’s and worker’s locations. Search is random: any worker may
meet any firm. The typical problem faced by a firm and a worker at the recruitment stage
is whether to form a match or not. MZ show that the Hosios condition — that is, workers’
bargaining power must be equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
the pool of unemployed — decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation. On the other hand, Shimer
and Smith (2001) — hereafter SS — point out a major source of ineﬃciency. In their frame-
work, workers diﬀer in skill levels, choose the magnitude of their search investment, and
can accept or reject a job oﬀer. They show that skilled workers undertake too low search
investments, and reject too few oﬀers. Conversely, unskilled workers undertake a too high
search intensity, and reject too many oﬀers. Put otherwise, the eﬃcient outcome cannot
be decentralized.
The purpose of this paper is to understand these two conflicting results better by
revisiting the MZ model. I proceed in two steps. First, I slightly alter the MZ model and
show that the decentralized outcome cannot be eﬃcient in that modified model. Second,
I compare this model formally to MZ and SS.
Concerning the first step, I assume that the search market is fully and endogenously
segmented by location. On each (sub-)market, job-seekers and vacancies meet according
to an (exogenous) constant returns to scale matching technology. The supply of vacancies
in each location is determined by a free entry condition. I assume that workers select the
range of markets in which they want to participate. Indeed, sending the worker where he
is best suited for does not insure he will be hired. The choice of subset is made on the
basis of a reservation product strategy, i.e. only segments that may oﬀer a wage above
the reservation wage are prospected. There exists an exogenous cost of search which is
arbitrarily small (or alternatively, individuals have a disutility if rejected for a job) which
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implies that workers do not apply for jobs they are not willing to occupy. To distinguish
this case from MZ, I refer to this search process as choosy search.
Unlike random search, choosy search generates a composition externality. While choos-
ing whether to enter a sub-market or not, workers do not take into account the impact
their participation has on the composition of the pool of job-seekers. This composition
in turn aﬀects firms’ willingness to advertise vacancies. As a result, there is no value
of workers’ bargaining power that can decentralize the eﬃcient allocation. In addition,
I find workers always search on a too wide range of markets. Indeed, workers prospect
jobs in locations that are too far from their own. From firms’ point of view, it is never
worth rejecting the application of these low ability workers, though the discounted output
flow generated by these workers is below the average cost to recruit them. This inability
to refuse matches ex-post that are ex-ante ineﬃcient is due to the fact that the cost of
advertising a vacancy is sunk at the time of hiring. No decentralized mechanism is at
play to deter the participation of individuals in sectors that are not well-suited to their
skills. In the absence of collective agreements to set minimum standards in the market
for skills, search is not suﬃciently choosy.
Concerning the second step, I slightly alter my model to compare it with MZ and SS.
MZ corresponds to the case where agents search in all locations, regardless of whether
they are willing to take the job or not. I introduce an error component in the choice
made by the agents about the subset of locations in which they try to get a job. With
some exogenous probability, agents get a random oﬀer from the whole circle. I show
that the externality vanishes as the latter probability tends to one. This explains why
the eﬃcient outcome can be decentralized in MZ: workers make systematic errors while
sampling jobs, and cannot use the information they have concerning the skill requirement
of jobs. As far as they can use this information, sampling becomes more selective, but
insuﬃciently. To compare with SS, I allow the agents to set their search intensity in each
location1. As agents diﬀer in the composition of their skills, there is a continuum of skills
in each location. I show that workers search too little for jobs they are highly qualified
for and too much for jobs they are less qualified for. Hence, I can replicate the SS results
on each location of the technological circle. Thus, the insight of this paper is that in
an environment with heterogeneity in match quality, if workers can refine their search —
either by choosing the subset of jobs to prospect, or by setting a diﬀerent search intensity
for each type of job — it will typically not be possible to achieve eﬃciency with bargaining
alone.
This paper emphasizes the fragility of the Hosios condition, when we marginally modify
the way in which workers choose which jobs to apply for. This is particularly striking,
since from the individual point of view, workers are actually indiﬀerent between the two
rules (choosy search vs random search) for selecting which jobs to solicit. As an analogy,
suppose all unemployed workers could subscribe to a service that e-mails them about open
vacancies as soon as information about these vacancies becomes available. Suppose the
service could design a filter so that an unemployed worker only receives the e-mail if a
vacancy fits a certain criterion. As long as a worker does not mind looking at vacancies
1The number of firms is exogenous in SS, while there is free entry in my paper. Actually, the way the
model is closed is not very important. All that matters is the composition externality vehicled by search
decisions.
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for jobs he rejects (i.e. search is costless), he would be indiﬀerent between having such a
filter installed or not; that is, he would not care whether he learns about the vacancy and
is given the chance to say no as opposed to never being told about the vacancy in the first
place. But the possibility of using filters matters. The intuition is as follows: if the filter
allows firms to direct their vacancies to those who express an interest in the job, there will
be fewer mismatches and search will be more eﬃcient. More interestingly, a decentralized
search process will fail to be eﬃcient when we allow for such filters, even when the Hosios
condition is satisfied. The reason is that workers fail to take into account that when they
put down their name for a vacancy, they create congestion for others. The size of such
congestion externality does not depend on workers’ type, but the benefit accruing from
search does. As a result, workers end up applying for too many jobs, and welfare would
be higher if all workers searched more narrowly.
This paper is related to the literature that highlights a composition externality in
matching environments. Such composition externality always happens with random
search and vertical heterogeneity2, that is when agents diﬀer in a single (productive)
characteristic (see, e.g., Lockwood, 1986, and SS). In directed search models, the search
market is usually segmented by workers’ type, and workers search jobs in a single market
segment. There are no mismatch as a result (see, e.g., Shi, 2001, and Shimer, 2005).
However, there are models in which the search market is segmented by job type, but not
by workers’ type. Workers direct their search towards a particular market, but matching
is random within this market. In the two-sector models of Charlot and Decreuse (2005)
and Uren (2006), the participation decision thus generates a composition externality3. A
key aspect of this paper is to show that the composition externality survives when we
consider horizontal heterogeneity — workers have similar levels of skills, but in diﬀerent
fields — rather than vertical heterogeneity.
The notion of choosy search has already been used by Moscarini (2001), who proposes
a two sector matching model in which the contact technology depends linearly on the
number of active job-seekers, and workers may have any bundle of sector-specific skills.
However, he does not perform a normative analysis. Choosy search can be compared to
the notions of marketability and specialization highlighted in the literature on money and
search (see e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993, and Shi, 1997). The main idea in these papers
is that each producer faces a trade-oﬀ between specialization and marketability. Special-
izing in the production of a given commodity allows better productivity (or, equivalently,
saves on production costs), but at the expense of reducing the proportion of consumers
interested in purchasing the good, i.e. marketability is smaller. Typically, money plays
a crucial role in this approach as it enlarges the size of the market and therefore allows
producers to specialize. Under choosy search, there is no restriction on the number of
sub-markets that each worker may prospect, but the requirement that expected matching
2In Gautier and Teuling (2004), workers diﬀer in a skill level, while jobs diﬀer in a complexity level,
and better skilled workers have a comparative advantage in more complex jobs. The authors assume
increasing returns to scale in the matching technology. As a result, workers’ rate of contact does not
depend on the stationary composition of skills.
3In Uren for instance, low-skilled workers may decide to seek complex jobs because their productivity
is higher in such jobs, which reduces job creation in this sector and creates a crowding-out eﬀect for the
high-skilled. They massively decide to direct their search towards simple jobs. Decentralized matching is
then non-assortative, while eﬃciency requires the allocation of complex jobs to the high-skilled workers.
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gains must be positive on each sub-market. In a model where education determines the
scope of individual skills, Charlot et al (2005) also assume that the search market is seg-
mented by technology, and workers only participate in market segments for which they
have the relevant skills. However, individual productivity only depends on the technology,
and there is no composition externality in their paper.
Finally, Albrecht et al (2006) consider a model of directed search with multiple appli-
cations and homogenous agents. They allow for the choice of an endogenous number of
applications, and find that (whenever larger than 2) in equilibrium it is typically too large:
workers search too much. While the result is similar to the one in this paper, the reason
is entirely diﬀerent. They highlight an externality on firms that process applications but
end up losing the selected worker to a competitor. Both papers complement each other:
job-seekers may well apply for too many jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework. In section 3,
I shed light on the composition externality implied by choosy search. Section 4 shows that
workers prospect too many market segments. Section 5 formally compares the framework
to MZ and SS. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The model closely follows MZ, except for the matching technology4. I consider the sta-
tionary state of a continuous time economy populated by a continuum of heterogenous
firms and workers. Firms and workers diﬀer with regard to their location on the space of
technology. More specifically, workers are uniformly distributed on a circle with a perime-
ter of one. The total mass of workers is normalized to one. Heterogeneity in locations
can be attributed to ex-ante diﬀerences in tastes or fields of knowledge. Each worker is
either employed in a particular firm, or unemployed. There is no on-the-job search.
Firms are distributed along the same circle, yet their distribution is endogenous. I will
show later that, like workers, they will be uniformly distributed ex-post in a symmetric
equilibrium. Each firm has a unique position which can be either filled or vacant. Vacant
positions incur a flow cost c > 0 independent of the firm’s location. Filled positions
employ a worker and obtain a revenue from selling the output they produce. The price
of the consumption good is normalized to one.
All agents are risk-neutral and r is the rate of time preference, as well as the interest
rate of the economy.
Production. The productivity of a pair depends negatively on the distance between
the location of the worker and the location of the firm, what MZ term the mismatch
technology. Formally,
yij ≡ y (d (i, j)) (1)
where i (j) is the location of the worker (firm) and d (i, j) is the absolute distance between
i and j obtained by moving along the perimeter of the circle in the shortest direction. It
satisfies d (i, i) = 0 and d (i, i+ 1/2) = 1/2. The mismatch technology is characterized by
the following properties:
4There is also a minor diﬀerence concerning the production technology, which precludes the corner
solution in which workers prospect jobs on the whole search market.
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Assumption 1 The function y is strictly decreasing, with y (0) = y0 > 0 and y (1/2) =
0.
The strict monotonicity of y and y (1/2) = 0 together will imply that there exists
a critical distance above which firms and workers not only never match, but also never
meet.
Matching sector. Here is the critical departure from MZ. MZ describe their model as
a framework with a unique search place where all firms and workers meet. Alternatively,
I suggest to formalize the search process as follows. The search market is segmented by
location: job advertisements convey full information on the skill requirement, and there is
a separate search sub-market for each location. The MZ model may then be interpreted as
a framework where workers send their applications to all the diﬀerent locations, regardless
of whether they will accept an oﬀer or not. By contrast, I assume that workers only apply
on the sub-markets for which they are willing to take a position.
On each sub-market j, the flow of matches Mj is given by the matching technology:
Mj ≡M (nj, vj) (2)
where nj and vj are, respectively, the number of active job-seekers and vacancies on market
j. The function M has the standard following properties:
Assumption 2 The function M : [0,+∞)× [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) (i) is strictly increasing
in each of its arguments, strictly concave and admits constant returns to scale, (ii)
satisfies the following boundary conditions: M (z, 0) =M(0, z) = 0, for z ≥ 0, and
the Inada conditions.
Matches are equiprobably distributed among job-seekers, as well as among vacancies.
Denoting by θj ≡ vj/nj the market-specific tightness, the flow probability that a worker
receives an oﬀer from market j is m (θj) ≡M (1, θj).5 Symmetrically, the flow probability
that a firm meets an applicant is q (θj) = m (θj) /θj.
Firms’ and workers’ gains. Let s be the exogenous job separation rate. In the remain-
ing, workers and firms are identified by their locations i and j (resp.). Let Ui and Wij be
the asset values of an unemployed and an employed worker, respectively. Similarly, Jij
and Vj denote the values of a filled and of a vacant positions6. Finally, wij is the wage
paid to the worker. There is no unemployment benefit. Those values satisfy the standard
5More formally, the probability to receive an oﬀer from the segment [j, j + dj] is m (θj) djdt over the
time period dt. This makes clear that there cannot be multiple oﬀers at a time: when dj tends to 0, the
number of search places tends to infinity, but the contact rate specific to each place tends to 0. In the
Appendix, I demonstrate the impossibility of simultaneous oﬀers in the case where the contact rate is
the same in each location.
6As MZ, we keep the standard notation J for the value of a filled position even though this may create
confusion, as j is the location of the firm.
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arbitrage equations:
rUi =
Z i+1/2
i−1/2
max {m (θj) [Wij − Ui] , 0} dj (3)
rWij = wij + s [Ui −Wij] (4)
rJij = yij − wij + s [Vj − Jij] (5)
rVj = −c+ q (θj)E [max {Jij − Vj, 0}] (6)
Each contact generates a match surplus. When the match surplus is positive, it must be
shared between the firm and the worker. I follow the standard approach in the literature
and suppose that the wage is determined by Nash bargaining. This yields:
β (Jij − Vj) = (1− β) (Wij − Ui) (7)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s exogenous bargaining power. This sharing rule implies
that Wij ≥ Ui if and only if Jij ≥ Vj.
The number of vacancies advertised on each search sub-market is determined by free
entry. This implies all rents are null and drives the value of a vacancy down to zero, that
is Vj = 0 for all j ∈ [0, 1]. This yields
c/q (θj) = E [max {Jij, 0}] (8)
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I focus on the properties of the equilibrium. I only consider symmetric
equilibria. I first describe the reservation wage property of the unemployed search strategy.
Then, I compute tightness and solve for the general equilibrium.
Job-seekers’ behaviour. Wages can be derived from equation (4), (5), (7):
wij = βyij + (1− β) rUi (9)
It follows the diﬀerence between the asset values of an employed and an unemployed
worker satisfies
(r + s) (Wij − Ui) = β (yij − rUi) (10)
Lemma 1 Let {θj}1j=0 > 0 be given. For all i, there exists a unique σi ∈ (0, 1/2) such
that
Wij ≥ Ui iﬀ d (i, j) ≤ σi (11)
y (d (i, i+ σi)) = rUi (12)
rUi = β
Z i+σi
i−σi
m (θj)
yij − rUi
r + s
dj (13)
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Lemma 1 states the search behaviour follows a reservation wage-type of strategy. The
surplus derived from a match is strictly decreasing in the distance between the location
of the worker and that of the firm. The worker participates to all sub-markets yielding a
positive match surplus. This defines a critical distance σi below (above) which the worker
(does not) participates. The critical distance equalizes the output flow derived from the
limit location to the return to search.
As far as I do not impose anything but positivity to the sequence {θj}1j=0, workers of
diﬀerent locations may have diﬀerent reservation wage strategies, that is diﬀerent critical
distances σi. Taking account of these diﬀerences singularly complicates the analysis below.
For this reason, I only focus on symmetric equilibria and suppose θj = θ for all j. This
implies that firms are uniformly distributed along the circle. Indeed, θj = θ for all j implies
that σi = σ for all i. Given that workers are uniformly distributed along the circle, the
unnormalized density of job-seekers in each location is n = 2uσ, that is the number of
unemployed times the search span in both directions. It follows that the unnormalized
density of firms in each location is v = θ2uσ, i.e. firms are uniformly distributed.
Despite they are heterogenous, all workers face the same market conditions. As a
consequence, the return to search is the same for all, and so is the reservation strategy.
The return to search rU and critical distance σ solve:
rU =
βm (θ)
r + s+ 2βm (θ)σ
Z σ
−σ
y (d (0, j)) dj (14)
rU = y (d (0, σ)) (15)
Matching frictions make workers less selective. The critical distance σ is thus decreasing
in market tightness θ.
From now on, I drop location-specific indices and summarize heterogeneity as follows:
Ui = U , Wij =W (x), Jij = J (x), yij = y (x), wij = w (x), where x ≡ d (i, j).
Tightness determination. Assume rU is given. From the wage equation (9), the value
of a filled job with an x-worker is worth
J (x) = (1− β) y (x)− rU
r + s
(16)
Replacing (16) in the free entry equation (8) determines the tightness in each sector. I
obtain:
c
q (θ)
= (1− β) y (σ)− rU
r + s
(17)
where y (σ) ≡ σ−1
R σ
0
y (x) dx is the average productivity among the job-seekers. Equa-
tion (17) defines common sector-specific tightness as an increasing function of the mean
productivity of the job-seekers. As
y0 (σ) =
y (σ)− y (σ)
σ
< 0 (18)
tightness is strictly decreasing in the critical distance σ. It follows that choosy search
generates a composition externality, transiting through firms’ willingness to post vacan-
cies. When the return to search rU rises, workers become more selective and σ goes down.
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The average productivity of job seekers rises as a result. Due to rent-sharing, expected
profits are increasing in average productivity, which encourages job creation.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is composed of a return to search rU , a critical techno-
logical distance σ and a tightness θ solving together (14), (15) and (17). Using the fact
that y (σ) = rU , solving for an equilibrium reduces to find a pair (σ∗, θ∗) such that
y (σ) =
2βm (θ)
r + s+ 2βm (θ)σ
y (σ) (RS)
c
q (θ)
=
1− β
r + s
[y (σ)− y (σ)] (FE)
(RS) is the reservation strategy curve stemming from workers’ job search behaviour. It is
downward sloping in the (σ, θ) plane, as workers get more choosy when tightness increases.
(FE) is the free entry curve. Its slope is ambiguous, reflecting the two opposite eﬀects
of σ on firms’ profitability. On the one hand, an increase in σ means a decrease in the
return to search. In turn, outside options are lower at the wage bargaining stage, which
improves firms’ gains. This eﬀect also happens in MZ. On the other hand, an increase
in σ deteriorates the sector-specific mean productivity of the job seekers, which reduces
firms’ profitability. This eﬀect does not happen in MZ.
Proposition 1 (i) There exists a symmetric equilibrium
(ii) There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium if y is concave
(iii) When the symmetric equilibrium is unique,
dσ∗/dβ Q 0 iﬀ β − 1 + α (θ∗) Q 0
where α (θ) ≡ θm0 (θ) /m (θ) ∈ (0, 1).
Existence follows from the continuity and the boundary properties of (RS) and (FE).
As (FE) may have decreasing parts, uniqueness is not guaranteed. However, the equilib-
rium is unique when y is concave in x.7 Hence, the slope of (FE) is always positive and
there is a unique equilibrium; it is depicted by Figure 1.
[Figure 1: Uniqueness of equilibrium]
Property (iii) depicts the eﬀect of the price of skills on workers’ choosiness. Like the
standard case with random search and job rejections, the impact of the bargaining power
depends on the diﬀerence between the (exogenous) share of total match surplus obtained
by the workers and their contribution to the matching technology, that is on β − 1 +
α (θ∗). As α generally depends on tightness, and equilibrium tightness is parametrized by
the bargaining power, this condition may be non linear, implying several local extrema.
However, in the smooth case of a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, σ∗ is ∪-shaped in β,
reaching its minimum in β = 1−α. This implies the extent of the mismatch is minimized
when the so-called Hosios condition holds. This result is similar to the stochastic-job
matching model with random search (see MZ and Pissarides, 2000).
7This case includes the linear mismatch technology chosen by MZ to illustrate their results.
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4 Decentralized vs eﬃcient allocation of talents
In this section, I show that the decentralized allocation is never constrained eﬃcient.
Agents are always insuﬃciently selective, irrespective of bargaining power. As a result,
they prospect a job on too many market segments.
As is standard, I consider the case where r → 0. The social planner aims to maximize
steady-state consumption, i.e. total output net of search costs (see Hosios, 1990, and
Pissarides, 2000):
(θp, σp) ∈ arg max
θ≥0,σ∈[0,1/2]
{(1− u) y (σ)− cv} (19)
where y (σ) ≡
R σ
0
y (x) dx/σ. The planner controls for sector-specific tightness θ, and
for the critical distance σ. The maximization program is subject to the Beveridge curve
u = s/ (s+ 2m (θ)σ) and to the definition of tightness, which implies v = 2θuσ.
The first-order condition with respect to tightness is:
−∂u
∂θ
y − c∂v
∂θ
= 0 (20)
While choosing the number of vacancies, the planner balances the two standard search
externalities arising from constant returns to scale in the matching technology: advertising
an additional vacancy translates into a rise in workers’ job-finding rate, but into a fall in
firms’ recruitment rate.
The first-order condition with respect to critical distance is:
−∂u
∂σ
y + (1− u) ∂y
∂σ
− c∂v
∂σ
= 0 (21)
As usual, the first term is the gain following the decrease in the unemployment rate, and
the second term is the loss in average productivity. The novelty comes from the third
term, which takes into account the impact of σ on search costs. That is,
∂v
∂σ
= 2θσ
∂u
∂σ
+ 2θu = 2θu2 > 0 (22)
The critical distance raises congestion as each worker participates to a larger number of
markets.
Manipulating the diﬀerent equations, I finally get the following characterization of the
eﬃcient allocation:
y (σp)
s
=
(1− αp) 2m (θp)σp
s+ (1− αp) 2m (θp)σp
y (σp)
s
+ c/q (θp) (23)
c/q (θp) =
αpy (σp)
s+ (1− αp) 2m (θp)σp (24)
where αp ≡ θpm0 (θp) /m (θp). Equations (23) and (24) must be compared to equations
(RS) and (FE), which characterize the decentralized allocation. The right-hand side of
equation (23) is split into two terms to ease the comparison.
Proposition 2 σ∗ > σp for all β ∈ [0, 1]
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Unlike MZ, the decentralized allocation cannot replicate the eﬃcient allocation, even
when the Hosios condition holds. There is a simple way to see it. We know from Propo-
sition 1 that σ∗ is minimized when the Hosios condition holds. In that case, the decen-
tralized allocation and the eﬃcient allocation obey very similar equations, but the second
term on the right-hand side of equation (23). Indeed, the planner chooses σp so that the
discounted output flow of the least productive worker in a particular location covers the
opportunity cost of working in the corresponding sector, plus the average search spending
in that search place. This second term implies that y (σp) > y (σ∗), which is equivalent
to σp > σ∗. Indeed, there is an additional externality to the standard stochastic-job
matching model. Increasing σ raises congestion eﬀects in each market, and deteriorates
the quality of job-seekers in each sector through a composition eﬀect. The planner takes
this eﬀect into account, and therefore sets a lower σ.
The question remains to know why firms hire workers whose productivity is insuﬃcient
to cover the average search cost incurred to recruit them. The reason relies on the fact
that search costs are sunk at the time of hiring the worker. Hence, matches that are
ex-ante ineﬃcient become profitable ex-post. If firms were able to commit on a minimum
skill level, workers would not search jobs in locations that are too far from their own and
the Hosios condition would decentralize the eﬃcient allocation.
To distinguish the distortions induced by choosy search from the distortions due to
inadequate bargaining power, I now address the following question: at given β, r → 0,
what is the eﬃcient choice of σ? The planner still maximizes steady-state consumption.
Its unique instrument is the critical technological distance σ, while tightness results from
firms’ choice of entry on the search market. Formally, the maximization program is the
following: eσ ∈ arg max
σ∈[0,1/2]
{(1− u) y (σ)− cv} (25)
subject to the definition of tightness θ = v/ (2uσ), the Beveridge curve u = s/ (s+ 2m (θ)σ),
and the free entry condition c/q (θ) = (1− β) [y (σ)− rU ] /s, where rU stands for lim
r→0
rU .
The problem (25) is equivalent to8
eσ ∈ arg max
σ∈[0,1/2]
rU (26)
subject to c/q (θ) = (1− β) [y (σ)− rU ] /s. The objective is simply the return to search
of a representative job-seeker9. However, and unlike individuals, the planner takes into
account the fact that changes in σ alter the composition of job seekers in each sub-market,
and therefore aﬀect tightness. The first-order condition can be written as follows:
y (eσ) = rU + α (θ)
1− α (θ) [y (eσ)− y (eσ)] > rU (27)
where α (θ) ≡ θm0 (θ) /m (θ). The social return from the critical technological distance
is lower than the private return, and the planner sets a lower σ than the one chosen by
individuals. Importantly, such a result cannot arise in MZ, where job rejection is actually
eﬃcient at given bargaining power.
8Here, it is implicit that rU stands for the return to search at given σ, a (small) departure from (3).
9This is a general property in matching models. See Pissarides (1986).
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5 Understanding the results
In this section, I slightly alter my model to compare it to MZ and SS. In the former case,
I introduce some imperfection in workers’ ability to sort vacancies by job type. In the
latter case, I introduce sector-specific search intensity.
Comparing with MZ. In MZ, search is random, and workers can meet firms from any
location on the technological circle. Individuals have ex-ante diﬀerences, but they do not
act on the knowledge of comparative advantages. They wait to match, and then decide.
The model is formally equivalent to Pissarides (1985) stochastic job matching model with
ex-post heterogeneity (see Pissarides, 2000). There are no composition externality, and
the Hosios condition decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation both in Pissarides and MZ.
I introduce some imperfection in the filter agents use to sort the vacancies. With
probability ε ∈ [0, 1], the filter does not work and the unemployed gets an oﬀer from an
arbitrary location on the circle — a random oﬀer. With the remaining probability 1− ε,
the filter returns a job oﬀer from the pool of prospected markets — a choosy oﬀer. Choosy
search means ε = 0, while ε = 1 corresponds to MZ.
An unemployed must take two decisions: Which set of markets to prospect, and
whether to accept a potential random oﬀer or not. Let σcs denote the critical distance
corresponding to the farthest prospected market. Similarly, σmz is the farthest accepted
job oﬀer. The value of unemployment and the value of a vacancy are now expressed as:
rU = max
σcs,σmz
2βm (θ)
r + s
{(1− ε)σcs [y (σcs)− rU ] + εσmz [y (σmz)− rU ]} (28)
rV = −c+ q (θ) {(1− ε)E [J (x) | J (x) ≥ V ]
+εPr (J (x) ≥ V )E [J (x) | J (x) ≥ V ]− V } (29)
With probability 1 − ε, the firm receives a choosy application. Such application always
leads to an employment relationship, as the worker makes sure ex-ante that each meet-
ing is mutually acceptable. With probability ε, the firm receives a random application.
This type of applications leads to an employment relationship if and only if the distance
separating the worker and the firm is smaller than the critical distance σmz. Such an
event happens with probability Pr (J (x) ≥ V ) = Pr (x ≤ σmz) = σmz. This term is the
key diﬀerence between MZ and the choosy search model. Other asset equations remain
unchanged.
A representative unemployed chooses σcs and σmz so that y (σcs) = y (σmz) = rU .
The worker sets the same critical distance σ, resulting in each case from a no-surplus
condition. Noteworthy, the private choice of σmz does not involve any externality, while
σcs still generates the composition externality identified in the previous section.
To show this, I use the free entry condition V = 0 to get
c
q (θ)
=
1− β
r + s
{(1− ε) [y (σcs)− rU ] + εσmz [y (σmz)− rU ]} (30)
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This equation defines tightness as a function θ = θ (σcs, σmz), with
∂θ (σcs, σmz)
∂σcs
sign
=
y (σcs)− y (σcs)
σcs
< 0
∂θ (σcs, σmz)
∂σmz
sign
= y (σmz)− rU
Using y (σcs) = y (σmz) = rU , the latter equation becomes ∂θ (σ, σ) /∂σmz = 0. A
marginal decrease in σcs raises tightness, while a marginal decrease in σmz does not aﬀect
it. Intuitively, σmz maximizes the total surplus accruing from a contact. Given that the
value of a vacancy positively depends on such surplus, σmz maximizes both the value of
unemployment and the value of a vacancy. Put diﬀerently, the choosy search behaviour
is ineﬃcient because it generates composition eﬀects, while the random search behaviour
is eﬃcient because it does not alter the distribution of job seekers in each market.
To confirm this intuition, I consider the planner’s choices, taking as given the bargain-
ing power and the tightness resulting from free entry. I focus on the case where r → 0.
Eﬃcient choices result from
rU = max
σcs,σmz
2βm (θ (σcs, σmz))
s
{(1− ε)σcs [y (σcs)− rU ] + εσmz [y (σmz)− rU ]}
This yields the following first-order conditions:
y (eσcs) = rU + α (θ)
1− α (θ) [y (eσcs)− y (eσcs)] > rU
y (eσmz) = rU
Three properties can be derived from such conditions. First, the decentralized equilibrium
is ineﬃcient. Second, the planner sets two diﬀerent critical distances. Like individuals,
the planner chooses the threshold σmz so as to equalize the worst output to the return
to search. However, the planner sets a lower threshold σcs to account for its negative
impact on job creation. Finally, note that both σcs and σmz are too high compared to
the planner’s solution. Indeed, σmz does not respond to the correct incentives as rU is
ineﬃciently low. The magnitude of such ineﬃciency depends on ε. When ε is close to 1,
the worker mainly receives random oﬀers, so that the return to search is only marginally
aﬀected by the critical distance σcs.
Comparing with SS. In SS, agents also have ex-ante diﬀerences, but they diﬀer in skill
level. To simplify, they are good, or bad. There is a single search market, and individuals
choose their search intensity. SS show that bad agents search too intensively, while good
agents undertake too low search investments10. My model can replicate this result on
each market of the continuum [0, 1]. I let the agents choose their search intensity on each
sub-market11. The composition externality then implies that the unemployed search too
much in sectors far from their technological location, while they search too little in closer
10SS also show that high-skilled (low-skilled) workers reject job oﬀers too rarely (frequently).
11In a partial equilibrium model of regional segmentation, Burda and Profit (1996) consider a similar
exercise in which search costs vary with the distance between worker’s location and the prospected search
market.
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sectors. Put diﬀerently, workers do not search enough where they have a comparative
advantage — where they are good —, and search too much where they do not — where they
are bad.
Let λ (x) denote search intensity on sub-market (located in) x. I assume the search
cost is linear in λ (x), while the search technology has decreasing marginal returns. The
search intensity λ costs κλ, with κ > 0, while it oﬀers f (λ) eﬃciency units of search, with
f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0, f 0 (λ) > 0, and f 00 (λ) < 0 for all λ > 0.
The individual pattern of search intensity by sector is derived from the following
maximization program:
rU = max
{λ(.)}
*
2
Z 1/2
0
[m (θ) f (λ (x)) (W (x)− U)− κλ (x)] dx
+
(31)
Other asset equations remain unchanged. The first-order conditions together with the
wage equation yield:
βm (θ) f 0 (λ (x))
y (x)− rU
r + s
= κ for all x ≤ σ (32)
where y (σ) = rU .
Proposition 3 The optimal search intensity λ (x, .) is such that
(i) λx (x, .) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, σ]
(ii) There exists a unique bx ∈ [0, σ] such that λθ (x, .) R 0 iﬀ x Q bx
The decrease in search intensity with technological distance simply reflects the decrease
in wage due to lower productivity. The main implication is that for a particular sector,
there is a continuous distribution of types, and search intensity is strictly increasing in
worker’s type/sector-specific productivity. This result mimics SS, where the good search
more than bad. Moreover, search intensity is negatively related to tightness in sectors
where occupations are ill-suited to the worker, and positively related to tightness in sectors
where occupations fit better the worker’s skills. Indeed, tightness exerts two conflicting
eﬀects on search intensity. The first eﬀect is sector-specific: tightness directly raises the
marginal benefit to search eﬀort, which tends to increase search intensity. The second
eﬀect is indirect: tightness raises the value of unemployment, which tends to reduce
search eﬀorts. The former eﬀect dominates the latter at low values of x, and is dominated
at higher values. This property is a consequence of symmetric comparative advantages.
It diﬀers from SS, in which tightness increases search investments irrespective of the skill
levels. In their framework, the indirect eﬀect is always dominated by the direct eﬀect,
because workers having a lower productivity also have a lower value of unemployment.
To close the model, I use the free entry condition to get
c
q (θ)
=
1− β
r + s
[y − rU ] (33)
where y ≡
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) y (x) dx
£R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
¤−1
is the mean productivity among the job
seekers of a given sector. This is a functional that depends on the whole path of sector-
specific search intensities {λ (.)}. Equation (33) shows the interest of this reformulation
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of SS. In SS, diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent search eﬀorts and reservation wages. As a
result, one must account for the endogenous distribution of workers’ skills. By contrast,
workers share the same reservation wage rU in my model, which simplifies the analysis.
Taking the Volterra derivative of the functional y with respect to a small variation of
λ (z) in the neighbourhood of the distance x yields:
y0 (λ (z) , x) =
f 0 (λ (x))R σ
0
f (λ (z)) dz
[y (x)− y] (34)
It follows that tightness is increasing (decreasing) in the search intensity of workers whose
productivity is above (below) the average. Together with property (ii) of proposition 3,
this latter result oﬀers a new multiplier eﬀect. By searching more intensively in sectors
that best fit their characteristics, workers improve tightness. This in turn makes them
search less intensively in distant sectors, and more intensively in closer sectors.
To analyze the eﬃciency properties of the decentralized equilibrium, I study the search
intensities that would be chosen by a social planner, taking as given workers’ bargaining
power and accounting for changes in tightness resulting from firms’ free entry on the
matching market. I consider the case where r → 0. The socially eﬃcient search intensities
result from
max
λ(.)
{rU} (35)
subject to c/q (θ) = (1− β) (y ({λ (.)})− rU) /s. The first-order conditions to the maxi-
mization program yield
βm (θ) f 0 (λ (x))
s
½
y (x)− rU + α (θ)
1− α (θ) (y (x)− y)
¾
= κ (36)
The social marginal return to search is higher than the private marginal return when
y (x) > y, that is when the worker improves the mean productivity among the job seekers.
Conversely, it is lower than the private marginal return when y (x) < y. It follows that
workers search too little on market segments where they have a comparative advantage,
and too much on market segments where they have a comparative disadvantage. This
result parallels SS, where the good agents search too little and the bad agents search too
much.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a multi-sector matching model with ex-post Nash bargaining where
workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills à la Salop (1979). The search market is
segmented by sector and workers choose whether or not to participate to each sector.
In this framework, searching for a job involves deciding how far to search. I show that
such a search behaviour generates a composition externality: while choosing the range of
markets where they participate, workers do not internalize the impact of their choice on
the mean skill level among the workforce attached to each sector. As a result workers
search too much, i.e. in too many sectors, and the decentralized allocation of talents
cannot replicate the eﬃcient allocation, irrespective of the bargaining power.
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The model may be extended along several directions. First, one may introduce a
minimum wage. Intuitively, the minimum wage may help to improve the allocation of
workers to jobs by making low productivity pairs non-profitable. Secondly, one may
endogenize the distribution of skills across sectors, through, say, schooling. The likely
result of such an analysis is that workers may well invest the right amount in schooling,
but allocate it wrongly between the diﬀerent sectors. Those extensions are on my research
agenda.
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APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1 Replacing equation (10) into equation (3) I get:
rUi =
Z i+1/2
i−1/2
max
½
βm (θj)
r + s
(yij − rUi) , 0
¾
dj (37)
Lemma 1 follows from Assumption 1, namely from the facts that yij ≡ y (d (i, j)) is
continuous and strictly decreasing in d (i, j) from y0 to 0.
Proof of proposition 1 An equilibrium is a non-negative vector (σ∗, θ∗) such that
m (θ) =
r + s
2β
y (σ)
σ [y (σ)− y (σ)] (38)
c
q (θ)
=
1− β
r + s
[y (σ)− y (σ)] (39)
To show (i), I simply prove equations (38) and (39) define two loci in the plane
(σ, θ) that intersect at least once.
Step 1. Equation (38) defines an implicit function θ1 ≡ Θ1 (σ); it is continuous on
(0, 1/2], strictly decreasing, and such that lim
σ→0
Θ1 (σ) = +∞ and Θ1 (1/2) = 0.
The existence, uniqueness and continuity of the function Θ1 over the range (0, 1/2]
result from Assumption 2, which implies that m is strictly increasing from 0 to
infinity. In addition, dΘ1 (σ) /dσ has the sign of
y0 (σ)σ [y (σ)− y (σ)] + y (σ)σy0 (σ) = σy0 (σ) y (σ) < 0 (40)
The fact that Θ1 (1/2) = 0 is induced by Assumption 2, which implies that m (0) =
0. Finally, y (0) = y0 > 0, while L’Hôpital’s rule implies that
lim
σ→0
σ [y (σ)− y (σ)] = 0 (41)
The fact that lim
σ→0
Θ1 (σ) = +∞ results from Assumption 2, which also implies that
lim
θ→+∞
m (θ) = +∞.
Step 2. Equation (39) defines an implicit function θ2 ≡ Θ2 (σ); it is continuous on
[0, 1/2], and such that Θ2 (0) = 0 and Θ2 (1/2) > 0.
The existence and uniqueness of the function Θ2 follow from Assumption 2. Using
L’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
σ→0
y (σ) = y0 and lim
θ→0
1/q (θ) = lim
θ→0
1/m0 (θ) = 0 (42)
Therefore, Θ2 (0) = 0. Moreover, y (1/2) > y (1/2) = 0. It follows thatΘ2 (1/2) > 0.
Step 3. Conclusion.
17
An equilibrium solves θ∗ = Θ1 (σ∗) = Θ2 (σ∗). The existence of equilibrium follows
from step 1 and step 2. Namely, the continuity and the limit values of functions Θ1
and Θ2 imply that there exist σ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that Θ1 (σ∗) = Θ2 (σ∗).
(ii) To prove claim (ii), it is suﬃcient to show that the curve (FE) is upward sloping
for all σ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Let z (σ) = y (σ)− y (σ); Θ02 (σ) has the sign of z0 (σ). But
z0 (σ) = −z (σ)
σ
− y0 (σ) (43)
Suppose that (ii) is not true. Hence, there exists some s ∈ (0, 1) such that z0 (s) < 0.
However,
z00 (σ) =
z (σ)− σz0 (σ)
σ2
− y00 (σ) (44)
Since y is concave and z0 (s) < 0, z00 (s) > 0. By induction, z0 (σ) < 0 for all σ ≤ s.
In particular, z0 (0) < 0, which is impossible because z (0) = 0 and z (σ) > 0 for all
σ > 0.
(iii) To sign the eﬀect of β, it is necessary to diﬀerentiate the system (RS)-(FE).
From step 1 of the proof of claim (i), we have
c
q (Θ1 (σ, β))
=
1− β
r + s
[y (σ)− y (σ)] (45)
where the dependence of function Θ1 vis-à-vis β has been made explicit. As the
equilibrium is unique by assumption, dσ∗/dβ has the sign of
A ≡ − c
q2
q0
∂Θ1
∂β
+
y (σ)− y (σ)
r + s
(46)
Using the fact that θm0 (θ) /m (θ) = α (θ),
∂Θ1
∂β
= − θ
α (θ)β
(47)
Using the fact that −θq0 (θ) /q (θ) = 1− α (θ), I get
A =
1
α (θ∗)β
y (σ)− y (σ)
r + s
[β − (1− α (θ∗))] (48)
which shows (iii).
Proof of proposition 2 I first write the return to search as a function of bargaining
power, tightness, and critical distance σ, i.e. rU (β, θ, σ) so that
rU (β, θ, σ) = 2βm (θ)
y (σ)− rU (β, θ, σ)
s
(49)
The eﬃcient allocation is such that
(θp, σp) = arg max
θ≥0,σ∈[0,1/2]
½
(1− u) y (σ)− c
q (θ)
2m (θ)uσ
¾
(*)
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subject to u = s/ (s+ 2m (θ)σ). The first-order condition with respect to tightness
yields:
c
q (θ)
=
α (θ) y (σ)
s+ (1− α (θ)) 2m (θ)σ (50)
Let θp (σ) be the implicit function solving the latter condition. The maximisation
problem becomes
σp = arg max
σ∈[0,1/2]
{rU (1− α (θp (σ)) , θp (σ) , σ)} (**)
with θp = θp (σp).
Now, let θ∗ (β, σ) denote the implicit function solving
c
q (θ)
=
1− β
s
[y (σ)− rU (β, θ, σ)] (51)
The decentralized allocation is such that:
y (σ∗) = rU (β, θ∗ (β, σ∗) , σ∗) (52)
Now, let
³bβ, bσ´ ∈ arg max
β∈[0,1],σ∈[0,1/2]
rU (β, θ∗ (β, σ) , σ). Using the first-order condi-
tion and the definition (**) of σp and θp, I obtain bβ = 1 − α (θp), and bσ = σp. In
addition,
y (σp) = rU (1− αp, θ∗ (1− αp, σp) , σp) +
αps
s+ (1− αp) 2m (θp)σpy (σ
p)
> rU (1− αp, θ∗ (1− αp, σp) , σp) ≥ rU (β, θ∗ (β, σ∗) , σ∗) = y (σ∗)
with αp = α (θp) and β ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that σp < σ∗.
Proof of proposition 3 (i) comes from the facts that f 00 < 0 and y0 < 0.
(ii) Note that
sign
½
∂λ (x, .)
∂m (θ)
¾
= sign
½
y (x)− y (σ)−m (θ) ∂rU
∂m (θ)
¾
(53)
with
∂rU
∂m (θ)
=
β
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
r + s+ βm (θ)
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
[y − y (σ)] (54)
It comes
sign
½
∂λ (x, .)
∂m (θ)
¾
= sign
½
y (x)− y (σ)−
βm (θ)
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
r + s+ βm (θ)
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
[y − y (σ)]
¾
= sign {F (x)}
But Fx < 0, F (σ) < 0 and
F (0) >
r + s
r + s+ βm (θ)
R σ
0
f (λ (x)) dx
[y0 − y (σ)] (55)
Claim (ii) follows.
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Proof that individuals cannot receive multiple oﬀers at the same time In this Ap-
pendix, I prove that workers searching on a continuum of independent matching
places cannot receive more than one oﬀer at a time. I prove this in the particular
case where the contact rate is the same in each place, which corresponds to the sym-
metric equilibrium studied in the paper. Without loss of generality, let I = [0, 1] and
cut it into n discrete intervals of equal measure 1/n. Assume that the probability
to receive an oﬀer from any interval is µdt/n over the period dt. I claim that
(i) As n tends to infinity, the probability to receive an oﬀer over any dt << ∞ is
strictly lower than 1
(ii) As dt tends to 0, the probability to receive more than one oﬀer at a time is 0
(iii) The result holds when n tends to infinity
Proof of (i). Let X be the number of oﬀers received over the period dt. The
probability to receive k ∈ {0, ..., n} oﬀers is:
P (X = k) = Ckn (µdt/n)
k (1− µdt/n)n−k (56)
As 1/n→ 0, it tends to
P (X = k) = e−µdt
(µdt)k
k!
(57)
Therefore,
P (X = 0) = e−µdt > 0 (58)
Proof of (ii). We have
p = P (X = 1 | X ≥ 1) = P (X = 1)
P (X ≥ 1)
=
µdt (1− µdt/n)n−1
1− (1− µdt/n)n (59)
As dt→ 0, we finally have
p→ µdt [1− µ (1− 1/n) dt]
µdt
= 1 (60)
Proof of (iii). Note that the latter proof holds for all n and remains true for n→∞.
In addition,
P (X = 1)→ e−µdtµdt (61)
and
P (X ≥ 1)→ 1− e−µdt (62)
Thus,
p →
dt→0
e−µdt
1− e−µdtµdt = 1 (63)
20
References
[1] Albrecht, J., Gautier, P., Vroman, S., 2006. Equilibrium directed search with multiple
applications. Review of Economic Studies 73, 869-891
[2] Barlevy, G., 2002. The sullying eﬀect of recessions. Review of Economic Studies 69,
65-96
[3] Burda, M., Profit, S., 1996. Matching across space: evidence on mobility in Czech
Republic. Labour Economics 3, 255-278
[4] Charlot, O., Decreuse, B., 2005. Self-selection in education with matching frictions.
Labour Economics 12, 251-267
[5] Charlot, O., Decreuse, B., Granier, P., 2005. Adaptability, productivity and the
educational incentives in a matching model. European Economic Review 49, 1007-
1032
[6] Diamond, P., 1982. Wage determination and eﬃciency in search equilibrium. Review
of Economic Studies 49, 217-227
[7] Gautier, P., Teulings, C.N., 2004. The right man for the job. Review of Economic
Studies 71-2, 553-580
[8] Hosios, A., 1990. On the eﬃciency of matching and related models of search and
unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57, 279-298
[9] Kiyotaki, N., Wright, R., 1993. A search-theoretic approach to monetary Economics.
American Economic Review 83, 63-77
[10] Lockwood, B., 1986. Transferable skills, job matching, and the ineﬃciency of the
natural rate of unemployment. Economic Journal 96, 961-974
[11] Marimon, R., Zilibotti, F., 1999. Unemployment versus mismatch of talents: recon-
sidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal 109, 266-291
[12] Moscarini, G., 2001. Excess worker reallocation. Review of Economic Studies 68,
593-612
[13] Pissarides, C., 1985. Short run equilibrium dynamics of unemployment, vacancies
and real wages. American Economic Review 75, 676-690
[14] Pissarides, C., 1986. Trade unions and the ineﬃciency of the natural rate of unem-
ployment. Journal of Labor Economics 4, 582-595
[15] Pissarides, C., 2000. Equilibrium unemployment theory. MIT Press
[16] Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 10, 141-156
[17] Shi, S., 1997. Money and specialization. Economic Theory 10, 99-133
21
[18] Shi, S., 2001. Frictional assignment. I. Eﬃciency. Journal of Economic Theory 98,
232-260
[19] Shimer, R., 2005. The assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination
frictions. Journal of Political Economy 113, 996-1025
[20] Shimer, R., Smith, L., 2001. Matching, search and heterogeneity. Advances in Macro-
economics (B.E. Journal in Macroeconomics) 1, article 5
[21] Uren, L., 2006. The allocation of labour and endogenous search decisions. Topics in
Macroeconomics (B.E. Journal in Macroeconomics) 6, article 13
22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
θ  
σ  2/1
Fig.1 : Uniqueness of equilibrium when y  is concave 
0 
(FE) 
(RS) 
